How can any government, especially those of small to medium sized developed states, be expected to anticipate contingencies when there are no maps to the future? It can be a weakness that is a result of a rnanmade situation, such as weaknesses in software programs that allow for easy hacking. This book is also intended to be a policy relevant study, rather than an academic one. The second underlying theme is the information revolution and what it is doing to intelligence analysis and strategic surprises. The second problern is that of expanding the understa~~ding of the kinds of signals in the environment that may well have a security implication. Instead of seeking to predict discrete future events, the strategic intelligence community must focus rather on risk-based anticipatory warnings concerning the nature and impact of a range of potential threats.
So stinging was the debate that it prompted the first wave of serious academic investigation which began in about 1975. Most of the reasons relate to either the secretive nature of the work or the sheer complexity of such a large and diverse community. The Lord, ~ n h a p p ywith the 13 Robert Strassler, ibid. The entity that is acting and causing the other entity to react clearly has the upper hand. It argues that this cannot and will not happen for a variety of reasons. This does not bode well for the future security of the state, as a long established sovereign state was not able to fully express its will over a nor state actor.
The potential brutality of our fellow human beings under these circumstances is astounding. The literature in the mid to late 1990s saw a significant split in its direction. Perhaps the most d i ~ c ~ofl all t is the need to provide equilibrium between the peace and order needed for a functioning society and the tolerance required for the citizens to be able to function. Free Membership Registration to Download Our library can be accessed from certain countries only. A threat can be defined in a number of ways, but for the purposes of national security The complex and uncertain international security Environment 25 intelligence, it can be put this way: A ,threat is a potential for an individual or a group source to exercise accidentally or intentionaily an action which exploits a vulnerability.
At the same time, some organized crime groups are becoming more political. Charters is the Director of the University of New Brunswick's Centre for Conflict Studies, and is also the Executive Editor of its Journal of Conflict Studies. He has 20 years of practical experience in a variety of intelligence positions. This brings us to the term risk. The economic, social and health aspects of the threat to the state can be every bit as damaging as the conventional state-to-statemilitary threats.
It argues that this cannot and will not happen for a variety of reasons. Most dangerously, it is also impossible to assess the strengths and weaknesses of strategic intelligence or how to make positive changes. Options do exist to enhance the odds for success or survival. In actual practice,the intelligence cycle represents an ideal which is not usually reached in the day-to-day workings of the community. The world requires more processing and analysis, not less. A vulnera~il~ty on a website may allow hackers to deface the site or take control of the banners.
Knowledge, rather than power, is the only weapon that can prevail in a complex and uncertain environment awash with asymmetric threats, some known, many currently unknown. But the issues are many and they include: gender, religion, race, politics, ethnicity, caste, sexual orientation, and physical disability. On top of all of this, we might be running out of oil and water. Spting thp Invisibk National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age This page intentionally left blank Seeing the Invisible National security intelligence in an Uncertain Age Thomas Quiggin Centre of Excellence for National Security S. Such predictions are not helpful to the policy maker. ~ The complex and uncertain international security Environment 33 As can be seen from the four categories above, each type of threat possesses a different set of skills and capabilities.
Ancient authors, such as Sun Tzu and Thucydides, were separated geographically by thousands of kilometers, yet they observed similar views on how their societies reacted in times of crisis, especially with respect to predictability and the avoidance of strategic surprise. Billions of dollars are being wasted through a lack of coordination and standurdization, and a lack of focus on re~uirementsanalysis, human productivit%and the need for ecasy access to multiple remote multi-lingual and multi-media databases. Such companies can demand and get states to change their taxation or Understanding National security 13 investment policies by simply promising to add new jobs in a given state. This is a pity, as academia has produced valuable schools of thought and tools of analysis that could further help to inform us about our world. His writings address the issues of decision making and related information a t what we would nowadays refer to as the strategic, operation and tactical level. Knowledge, rather than power, is the only weapon that can prevail in a complex and uncertain environment awash with asymmetric threats, some known, many currently unknown. As the major focus of the chapter is strategic intelligence assessment, this term will be broken down and defined first.
The definition of intelligence is somewhat more problematic, given the broad spectrum of interests covered by intelligence. Knowledge, experience, and organization are the major assets needed to survive and prevail in an asymmetric conflict. Instead of seeking to predict discrete future events, the strategic intelligence community must focus rather on risk-based anticipatory warnings concerning the nature and impact of a range of potential threats. This requires knowing what the interests of the state are in political, military, economic, social and er~vironmentalterms. Not one title reveals a direct interest in establishing a theory of what strategic intelligence assessments or estimates should be capable of doing. He holds a Masters Degree in International Relations.
As such, it offers little towards a theory of military intelligence, or to intelligence in general. The various commissions, such as the Pike Committee and the Church Committee focused on operations, but one of the little noted factors that surfaced was how little focus was put on analysis. With respect to intelligence flows, however, the sharing between states remains limited and the knowledge required which is the only useful weapon does not flow easily. It may not have made it to the right places in a timely manner or been understood, but it was there. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The state will continue to face a number of threats from other states, political extremists, transnational organized crimes, natural disasters, man made disasters, market forces and environ~entaldegradation. This page intentionally left blank Chapter4 Strategic Intelligence Assessment and surprise Attacks Operating in the international environment is a complex task, requiring broad based expertise in a number of fields such as politics, economics, law, military affairs and psychology.